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Dana Gold: Kent Greenfield is a professor at Boston College Law
School, and a very good personal friend. He is a progressive corporate
law scholar, and he has a new book coming out called The Failure of
Corporate Law. Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities.1 Kent
will be moderating this session, and this will be a lively discussion
between Professor Dan Greenwood of Utah at the University of Utah
College of Law, who focuses also in the area of corporate law, and Erik
Jaffe, who focuses his practice on First Amendment law.
Kent Greenfield: Thank you, Dana. Erik Jaffe and Dan Green-
wood will each talk for about ten minutes, and then the three of us will
converse for a few minutes before taking questions from the audience.
Daniel Greenwood: Thank you. Despite Professor Winkler's care-
ful advice to us, the corporate personality isn't the core of the issue here.
I'm going to make an argument that corporations are the wrong sort of
thing to have speech rights; that is, I'm going to ignore the law, which, as
Professor Winkler quite correctly points out, focuses on the rights of lis-
teners rather than the rights of speakers, and instead argue that the
speaker makes a difference. I'm happy to talk directly about listeners
afterwards, but I'm not going to do it here. This is an issue that could be
understood as part of the problem of the First Amendment and the
constitutionalization of economics.2
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1. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2007).
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
Almost a century ago in Lochner,3 Justice Holmes proclaimed that
the Constitution did not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.4 The
Court, however, disagreed, finding basic principles of so-called "laissez-
faire" economics in the contracts clause of the Constitution. After the
Second World War, and for a brief moment defined by footnote four of
Carolene Products,5 the Court changed course, concluding that the
backward-looking interpretive techniques of the judiciary were unlikely
to find answers to the dynamic needs of a shifting economy. Instead, the
courts would restrict themselves to structural issues: on the one hand,
ensuring the integrity of the democratic process through redistricting,
voting rights, and democratic debate; and on the other hand, giving spe-
cial attention to rectifying the historical racial injustice imbedded in the
American system.
But First Amendment doctrine regularly threatens to return the
Court to Lochner. Indeed, not merely Lochner in the sense of imposing
strained interpretations of ambiguous texts on an unwilling citizenry, or
Lochner in the sense of limiting democracy in the name of the rule of the
dead, but the specific Lochner-era judicial role of tilting the scales of
government in favor of our most protected minority: organized wealth.
The dominant metaphor of the First Amendment is the free market
of ideas that Professor Winkler has already mentioned to you. The free
market of ideas constantly tempts the Court back to the old Lochner-era
notion of freedom of contract because, as First Amendment theorists and
the Court discuss it, the market of ideas bears little resemblance to our
post-realist, highly self-conscious, legally constructed market.
In the real free market, property is a manipulable creation of state
law and contract, and tort and regulatory rights stem from political
processes, not from a "brooding omnipresence in the sky. ' 6 Legislators,
consulting firms, and reserve bankers freely change the rules to create
incentives that will act in a Hobbesian manner, "as hedges are set, not to
stop travelers, but to keep them in the way"7 towards collective attractive
goals: full employment, cheap televisions, and the like.
The free market of ideas is not described this way. Instead, the free
market of ideas borrows from the Lochner understanding of economic
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS
SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (1851).
5. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
6. S. Pac. R.R. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 206, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 258-73 (1651).
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markets. As Owen Fiss puts it, "the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment may not
enact the Social Statics of Mr. Herbert Spencer, but maybe the [F]irst
[A]mendment does.",8 Fiss's efforts notwithstanding, the rhetoric of the
free market of ideas remains tied to an image of pre-legal markets regu-
lated by supposedly neutral Court-enforced rules and accompanied by
Spencer's guarantee that competition for survival will generate not
merely survivors, but also truth and justice and the American way.
In this imaginary market, as in Lochner's imaginary market, all is
necessarily for the best in this best of all possible worlds, provided only
that legislatures are barred from interfering on behalf of market losers.
Those who win deserve to win. Any attempt to legislate different rules
that might generate different winners is a violation of secularly-sacred
rules of the game. In short, and particularly since markets operate by the
ancient principle that to those who have much, much will be given, might
makes right. 9
Much as the old freedom of contract was a radical improvement
over slavery or immutable status, 10 freedom of speech is a lot better than
its pre-modern alternative: censorship. Still, it is one of those freedoms
that is strangely more useful to the powerful than the powerless, that uses
the rhetoric of equality to reinforce inequality in the name of liberation.
Like freedom of contract, freedom of speech is a doctrine of selective
government abstention, and the absence of government always empow-
ers those who have the power to do as they please.
Again, like the freedom of contract, the ideology of freedom of
speech conceals the underlying property rights that generate the results it
justifies, claiming that they are pre-political in some sense, written into
the nature of the world or at least the Constitution, and thereby
transforming privilege into entitlement.
II. CORPORATIONS AND SPEECH
My principal expertise is corporate law rather than speech law, and
so for the rest of my limited time here I'm going to focus on one place
where the rhetoric of the free market of ideas conceals an underlying
power imbalance created by the law itself. My fundamental claim is that
corporations should not have speech rights because they are illegitimate
8. Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413, 1415 (1986).
9. The diminishing marginal utility of money, or as it might be more colorfully put, the Jean
Valjean principle, guarantees that voluntary transactions in free markets will always redistribute
upwards. Those who have more need more powerful persuasion to induce them to give up what they
have. For further discussion, see Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Diffi-
culty: Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 825 (2001).
10. See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Gendered Workers/Market Equality, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
323, 327 (2003).
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participants in political debate." I'm happy to talk later about the other
First Amendment, the one that creates a space for individual autonomy
and conscience free from politics or collective judgment; but here I'm
concerned principally with the First Amendment as an essential part of
democratic self-rule.
To simplify matters, I'm going to set aside the principle doctrinal
arguments. That is, first, what the corporations do is spend money, and
money isn't speech at all; and second, that most corporate advertising
and lobbying should be categorically excluded from the First Amend-
ment as commercial speech. I think I can show that even if money were
speech, and even if commercial speech were pure political speech, pub-
licly traded business corporations should have no political speech rights.
As Professor Winkler correctly stated, current doctrine emphasizes
the rights of listeners rather than the identity of corporate speakers. My
argument is, in effect, that this emphasis misses the key point. But I will
not deal with listeners directly. I am simply going to assume, rather than
argue, that if corporate advertising were ineffective in influencing voters
or legislators, normal market processes would eliminate it. I'm going to
take it for granted that when corporations speak, it makes a difference in
the actual results.
A. Corporations Are Not Citizens
The first step in my argument is obvious, but necessary nonetheless.
Corporations are neither humans nor citizens. They are not values in
themselves, but tools to human ends. Thus, they are not endowed by their
creators, whomever those may be, with certain inalienable rights, and
there is no reason that we should respect their claims to autonomy unless
we also conclude that corporate autonomy is useful to real human beings.
An important issue lurks here that I am going to fudge for the mo-
ment. If corporations are tools rather than ends in themselves, one ques-
tion is whose tools are they? We give varying answers to this question in
varying contexts. Usually, we think of corporations as businesses whose
social usefulness lies in the products or services they produce or the jobs
they create. That suggests that they are tools for consumers or employ-
ees. Sometimes, however, and especially when corporations are insisting
on rights against the citizenry or against a governmental body, the rheto-
ric switches and corporations are portrayed as tools of their investors or
shareholders rather than their consumers. Whether corporations are tools
11. See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83
IOWA L. REV. 995-1070 (1998) (discussing the issue of corporate speakers).
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for consumers, workers, or investors, however, they remain tools. The
goal of government should be the happiness of people, not legal persons.
B. Corporations Do Not Speak For Their Participants
The reality of corporate law is that our corporations are largely
autonomous as a formal, legal matter. That is, corporate leaders have
more or less the same authority to spend corporate assets as, say,
Mu'ammar AI'Qaddafi does with respect to Libya's assets. Here I agree
with Professor Winkler, with this slight caveat: there are two somewhat
enforceable limits on corporate decisionmakers' discretion regarding
corporate assets. First, federal law creates an enforceable obligation not
to lie to shareholders generally; and second, corporate decisionmakers
may not give corporate assets to themselves, unless they can present
some evidence that doing so is in the interest of the corporation.
As a market matter, however, corporate management is a good deal
more constrained. In competitive product markets, of course, competition
assures that any company that doesn't focus on keeping its private costs
of production below its competitors' private costs of production will be
driven out of business. In those markets, then, corporations are deeply
constrained. They can press for governmental action that reduces their
own costs or increases those of their competitors, but that's about it.
Moreover, with the possible exception of highly visible consumer
products sold largely on image, such as Nike shoes, the actual views of
the human beings who ultimately consume the service or product, often
several links further down the line, are largely irrelevant. I may or may
not have strong personal views on the way in which the parts suppliers to
a car door manufacturer treats its local environment or employees. But
the management of the company will only be interested in the cost of
manufacturing its parts relative to the price at which it sells them. My
views as a consumer of cars simply drop out well before they get back to
management. Indeed, as the Vermont recombinant bovine growth hor-
mone case 12 made clear, consumers generally are not even entitled to
information regarding the processes by which a product is made.' 3
The upshot is that the product market constrains producer corpora-
tions, but consumers do not. Consumers have many values. Markets only
seek high quality and low cost. The market has no view on externalities,
pollution, working conditions, cultural transformations, bovine growth
12. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 98 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. See Doug Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525-642 (2004).
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hormone or the like, except as they influence private costs or saleable
product quality.
The capital market functions similarly, but even more so. Standard
economic theory tells us that share prices are determined only by the
market's estimate of future returns to shareholders-dividends plus the
final payment on liquidation or sale. Most shareholders today are institu-
tions, constrained by law (in the case of pensions and endowments), or
markets (mutual funds, hired managers, and other Wall Street profes-
sionals), to profit maximize at the expense of whatever other values they
may have. Most of the humans who actually make decisions for these
institutional investors are under similar market constraints and role ex-
pectations: if they don't manage to beat the market, or at least match it,
they will be fired and will be replaced by somebody who does.
These apolitical, amoral investors create massive pressure on every
company to act in the way that those investors believe will maximize
stock price. Simply put, the professional investors stand to make a for-
tune if they can find stock that is not priced according to the market's
estimate of future returns to the shareholder, and in making their fortune,
they drive the price back to that benchmark. The result is that any inves-
tor who chooses to invest on other grounds simply has no effect on stock
price.
Simultaneously, any company that deviates from the financial mar-
ket's current theory of how to maximize share value creates a different
and equally profitable arbitrage opportunity. Its stock price will drop to
reflect its focus on something other than profit. Accordingly, a Wall
Street professional need only buy the stock at the low price, coerce or
convince management to shift their policies to the profit policy preferred
by the market, and then sell the stock at the new high price. This is, inci-
dentally, a stylized version of the takeover wars of the 1980s: the finan-
cial markets forced companies to abandon job creation as a goal in favor
of share value maximization.
The key for First Amendment purposes is to notice that this story
makes the corporation a slave-with a more or less long leash-to the
financial markets. Notice that I say "markets" and not shareholders. The
mechanism of control is through the stock market price, and price is de-
termined by sellers and by non-buyers as much as by current holders. So,
it is deceptive to call this shareholder control, as if it were a form of de-
mocratic rule. Indeed, the master is not even stock investors as a group. It
is the market itself, not the human beings who stand behind the invest-
ments, that determines the prices and send the messages to management.
After all, human beings tend to have values other than share price maxi-
mization. But since those values are even less likely to affect the market
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price of stock than consumer views on car door supplier part
manufacturer's local employment practices affect the price of cars, they
do not get conveyed to managers.
C. The Parable of the Cigarettes
So let's make it concrete. Imagine that a company produces a prod-
uct that is dangerously unhealthy and also somewhat disgusting, but also
addictive and highly profitable. Exercising some literary license here, we
could call it "cigarettes." I put the term in quotes to make clear that I am
talking about a general problem, not the consumer product of a similar
name. Imagine also that the vast bulk of the population agrees with my
polemical characterization of the product and believes that profiting from
addiction and death is basically immoral. My contention is that even if it
were the case that this view was widely, even universally, held by con-
sumers, investors, employees, and managers, neither the consumer nor
the financial markets would change the behavior of the firm in any way.
The firm will continue to do what it does without regard to the moral,
ethical, or political views of the people involved. 14
Start inside the firm. An employee who concludes that she is en-
gaged in murder has four options to choose among. When I teach this
issue, the most common response of my students is to conclude that they
ought to act like professionals-to set aside their personal beliefs, during
the workday at least, and work for the interests of the company. That is,
go ahead and murder while justifying your actions by saying you are just
doing your job. 5
The second option is to reduce cognitive dissonance by adapting
your personal beliefs to the reality of your work place, to simply adopt
the corporation's views as your own, to convince yourself that cigarettes
are safe or that people who use them should be protected in the exercise
of their autonomous choices to die. When Professor Winkler suggests
that taking away rights from corporations would simply transfer them to
the employees, who would act in their private life the way they do in
their professional life, he is relying on the common sense notion that
people often internalize the values of the institutions they join.
The third option is to advocate that the firm abandon its highly
profitable enterprise of murder. The corporate social responsibility
movement stays in business because it often turns out that on closer
14. See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law,
74 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 41 (2005).
15. Compare HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (1963), with STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW
(1974).
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examination, bad behavior is not as profitable as it seems. Too often,
faced with the difficulty of determining what the profit maximizing be-
havior might be, we simply rely on the false heuristics that if it hurts it
must be good for you, or if it is socially detrimental it must be privately
profitable.
But sometimes, surely extemalizing costs onto others is profitable.
And let us assume that selling sexy, addictive drugs to insecure teenagers
is one of them. Then, if you argue in favor of abandoning profit in favor
of other values-telling the cigarette company to switch to the addiction
prevention business-you are likely to find yourself fired and replaced
by somebody who will do the job properly. Alternatively, if you do suc-
ceed internally, your company will go out of business (or at least this
business). That victory, however, is likely to be purely Pyrrhic. It will
just be replaced by a company that will do the job properly. In either
event, so long as someone somewhere is willing to take your position or
some company somewhere is willing to exploit the open market niche,
the job continues to get done without regard for your or anyone else's
personal views.
And the last possible option is to quit and be replaced by a profes-
sional who is a little less of afeinschmecker.16 Quitting may cleanse your
soul, but as we just saw, it has no effect on the behavior of the
organization.
In short, Darwinian selection should assure that at any given time
the firm will be run by people who will pursue profit. The views of those
who think that profit ought to stop when murder begins just drop out of
the system.
The same thing happens in the financial markets, but, as usual, even
more so. If I sell my "cigarette" stock, the only effect will be that it will
be bought by somebody else with fewer moral scruples or a stronger
market incentive to set them aside. The price will continue to reflect the
market's profit, management will continue to use corporate assets in pur-
suit of that goal, and my sale will have been an entirely meaningless,
empty action. Actually, it is worse than that. Once I and those like me
have sold our stock, the stock will be held by people who think that ciga-
rettes are profitable and who do not care (enough) about whether they are
moral. So managers who take the "shareholder supremacy" or "share-
holder democracy" views of the corporation seriously may conclude that
by promoting cigarettes they are furthering the views of their constitu-
ents. My protest has the effect of strengthening the position I abhor.
Allow me to tie all this back to corporate speech.
16. Yiddish for someone overly concerned with their own odor.
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D. The Corporation as a Monomaniac
Corporations are monomaniacs. By that I mean that they are de-
signed to cause management to speak for a principle-profit maximiza-
tion-not as representatives of voters or other legitimate human actors
with a variety of values. They speak for one value and one value alone.1
7
They speak by spending money that belongs to the corporation, which is
to say money that has no clear human owner. They spend the money in
order to make profit. They do not speak for any other value except by
accident.
In the real post-Lochner world, we know that markets are incredi-
bly powerful tools, but they come with no guarantee of goodness. Mar-
kets will efficiently produce heroin or prostitution or nuclear prolifera-
tion or environmental destruction just as well as they will produce cheap
televisions. Real politics, post-Lochner, center primarily or most often on
directing markets: they create the invisible hand and guide it so that it
guides us in our private pursuit of profit.
If we allow markets to control their own regulation, they will do
only one thing: create markets, whether the markets are useful to human
flourishing or the opposite. Thus, giving corporations free speech is not a
form of human freedom. It simply coerces corporate fiduciaries to cam-
paign against limits to profit regardless of the cost to our other values. In
this era of global warming, one could even say our survival.
1 8
E. Conclusion: Towards Pluralist Democracy
Corporations are highly efficient machines for pursuing one impor-
tant goal: profit. But as every child confronted with a quart of ice cream
must learn, just because something is good does not mean that more of it
is always better. The key to our success as a capitalist democracy is
knowing how to guide and how to restrain and how to use the profit mo-
tive. Corporations, because they are slaves to that motive, are structurally
incapable of reflecting intelligently on how to structure it.
Granting corporations speech rights, in short, elevates our tools
above us, as a form of idolatry. We should no more allow the corpora-
tions to buy political influence than we should allow incumbent politi-
cians to use taxpayer funds to buy votes. The problem is the same:
instead of freeing ourselves to govern ourselves or freeing ourselves
from government itself, this perverted First Amendment does the reverse.
It frees our governance institutions from us, while limiting the spaces in
17. See, e.g., THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corp. 2004) (analyzing corporate form as
sociopathic).
18. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005).
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which we, as individuals, are free to act without regard for socially
mandated norms.
Thank you.
Erik Jaffe: I'll be far briefer. We've heard a lot of rhetoric about
the evils of corporations, monomania of the pursuit of profit-all of
which to my mind is wildly, wildly irrelevant to the First Amendment
issue.
The First Amendment is not about individual rights. It's not in the
part we're talking about, the political aspects of the First Amendment.
There are these other sort of self-fulfillment, make-you-happy kind of
aspects. And those are nice, but that's not what we're talking about here.
We're talking about the political aspects of the First Amendment, how it
intersects with the way we govern ourselves. And in my mind, the First
Amendment is not about who has rights. It's about who doesn't have
rights. And the object of that is the government. Congress, in the literal
version of it, does not have rights to restrict the freedom of speech.
The freedom of speech is not something that merely protects the
freedom of individuals to stand up and speak because if that were all it
was, then the only freedom of speech we'd have would be to get into the
public square, get on a soapbox, and yell. And I think very few people
would limit the First Amendment's freedoms to the realm of the soap-
box. What the First Amendment is about is taking the government out of
controlling and regulating the debate about what we should do with our
lives. The key areas, therefore, on which I disagree with Professor
Greenwood deal first with the generalized conception of what the First
Amendment does. It doesn't grant rights; it creates restrictions. It's a
negative rights concept. It stops the government from doing things.
Second, we disagree about the nature of corporations. Corporations
are simply associations of people. But quite frankly, even if they weren't,
even if they were freestanding entities with a mono-focus purpose of act-
ing and speaking in the pursuit of profit, I would still let them speak be-
cause the government should not be in the position of deciding what
ideas are good or bad and how much of those ideas ought to make it into
the marketplace. Much of the critique that we just heard, and much of the
critique, quite frankly, behind most campaign finance reform which we'll
hear about later, all bear this striking suspicion of speech: that speech can
somehow be evil as opposed to neutral. At the end of the day, good
speech, bad speech, it's just an input. It all goes into the mix.
Professor Greenwood's notion that you wouldn't speak if you
didn't think it would have some effect is true as far as it goes, but it
doesn't go very far. People speak all the time, thinking wrongly that they
may change someone's mind. People speak volumes. For example, you
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look at campaign finance and notice that the losing candidate spends a
ton of money on campaign ads and ultimately gets crushed because at the
end of the day the public listens to those ads, thinks the guy's a flake,
and votes against him. He's hoping that they'll like his ideas, but he turns
out to be wrong. Similarly, corporate lobbyists routinely lobby for things
that they don't get. Surprisingly, then, in Seattle we can't smoke in pub-
lic places. How could that possibly be with the vast wealth of cigarette
companies speaking and influencing us? I guess it doesn't always work.
The answer is that speech is certainly part of the debate and informs
people, but at the end of the day governmental bodies are not determined
by the speech either they hear or their citizens hear. They are determined
by the votes they get. Speech is not political in the same way that voting
is political. Speech is merely a context in which politics operates. It is
not the politics itself in the sense that Professor Greenwood indicated. It
doesn't control our political system. Speech merely informs the political
system for good or for ill.
Bad ideas get spoken. They get spoken often. But the notion that
saying it often and saying it loudly and saying it with a lot of money
somehow dictates the result is flawed. And even if there were some so-
ciological evidence to suggest that such reasoning helps doesn't matter.
And the reason it doesn't matter is because an assumption is built into
the First Amendment, a constitutionally mandated assumption, as Justice
Holmes speculated, that we leave it to the marketplace to decide these
things; that more speech the better, that speech is good.19
Any speech is good. It is not that the idea contained in the speech is
good, but that merely the act of expressing ideas is a public good.
Whether that expression comes from corporations or from individuals or
19. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). According
to Justice Holmes,
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.
Id. See also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (the First
Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly;
but we have staked upon it our all.").
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from anyone else doesn't matter. And for our courts to extend this
privilege to foreigners, I actually think foreign propaganda is fine. Lots
of speech is fine. It's all input. We should hear it all, make up our own
minds, have our government make up its own mind, and have our
senators and such make up their own minds.
The notion that speech can distort, which comes up all the time-it
comes up here, it comes up in campaign finance, and it comes up in the
securities context-quite frankly, is a constitutionally impermissible as-
sumption. And therefore, whether or not the corporation is a noble
speaker or ennoble, moral or immoral, is somewhat irrelevant. I wouldn't
make those judgments about individuals, though, because in many in-
stances I could more easily define moral individuals or immoral indi-
viduals than I could define moral or immoral corporations; yet, I
wouldn't let the government make that a criteria for allowing their
speech to go forward.
The other portion of Professor Greenwood's critique, I gather,
stems from, if you read or glanced at his article, the sort of failures in
corporate governance, which somehow take the shareholders, who I
think of as people in association with each other and with the entity, and
deprive them of the ability to have say over corporate speech. I reject that
notion as well. From my perspective, a corporation's purpose of what it
will do and how it will speak is dictated in large part by the articles of
incorporation, which set up the corporation's purpose, tell us what the
corporation is going to do, and then tell its managers to go and fulfill that
purpose. For example, anyone buying shares in a corporation knows that
ex ante if they don't want to associate with the corporation, they don't
have to. But they do want to associate with it, and this is not to say that
they will agree with every single thing the corporation does or that they
even substantially support everything the corporation does.
What it is to say, however, is that with a limited portion of their in-
tellect and their resources, they seek to pursue economic goals. Their
other resources and their time and their intellect may be devoted to
non-economic goals and, in fact, may be devoted to conflicting
non-economic goals. But they have decided to delegate the economic
portion of their thinking and action and speech to an economic associa-
tion, which is actually a mixed economic and political association, as I
think Professor Greenwood would agree, because much economic speech
is, in fact, political speech, and that's okay.
The notion that a contradiction exists here means that there's a con-
tradiction within all of us. We balance these tensions. We argue on be-
half of some things that help us economically, and other things that hurt
us economically, often at the same time. The fact that this balance should
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just break out into specialization by having corporations do half of our
arguing for us or a fifth of our arguing for us is not bothersome. To the
extent that there is some kind of conflict that stops shareholders from
collectively influencing the direction of their association as it relates to
speech, then it is corporate law that must yield, not the First Amendment.
Perhaps there should be more shareholder control. Perhaps there
should be means of having shareholder involvement in the direction or
the speech that their corporation engages in. To that extent, this would be
fine. The association of people comprising such a corporation could then
have greater internal control in the same way the Republican party would
say that the internal affairs of an organization should be left more to that
organization. At the end of the day, though, it is the entry and exit deci-
sions that count the most, and such decisions are voluntary except in the
case of pension plans, which are downstream a little bit further.
This is an economic trade-off that has to be made all the time, much
as the trade-off I might make if I joined the Sierra Club. I might agree
with 50% of what they do and despise the other 50%, but decide that, on
balance, it is worth giving them a few hundred bucks here and there.
Allowing the government to step in and regulate the speaker in this
instance strikes me as a quintessential example of viewpoint discrimina-
tion. That is precisely why Professor Greenwood wants to regulate them:
he does not like their viewpoint. He thinks their viewpoint is mono-
focused on economics. Professor Greenwood is pro-profits; he thinks that
viewpoint is somehow not as valuable as a sort of mixed or befuddled
viewpoint that balances these things because we cannot make up our
mind. At the end of the day, we could easily expect the viewpoint-based
limitations to expand.
If we took away First Amendment rights, we would not get a flat
ban on corporate speech. I would favor more what we would get: a ban
on corporations insulting congressmen. No negative ads. God forbid you
say to anyone that your senator is horrible, that John McCain is a fool.
God forbid we let corporations say that. That is exactly what you get. I
don't want to give government the power to start drawing those lines in
the absence of the First Amendment. In fact, many of those lines are im-
possible to draw. If you look at Professor Greenwood's article, he tries to
draw lines between who the author is-whether the speech is being
created by a wonderful director who loves his movie, or the speech is
created by a corporate entity that is just trying to get you to buy a
product.
In fact, those lines are not easily drawn. Many movies consist of a
little bit of both types of speech. There are a lot of mixed entities. There
are a lot of mixed motives. We could draw those lines, but the inevitable
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pressure on government would be to push the line in the direction of
greater restriction, so that it could exercise control over more and more
speech, particularly speech that would be critical of the government.
As I was listening to Professor Greenwood, it struck me that we are
children of our circumstances. Professor Greenwood has a fear and loath-
ing of corporate pursuit of profits to the extent of all other things; that's
the progressive viewpoint. I have the more classically liberal-now fully
conservative-viewpoint, which is a fear and loathing of government.
We value restrictions on one or the other according to our deepest fears.
One fear is of corporate domination of society, and the other fear is of
governmental domination of society. At the end of the day, I am not
seeking a utopia. I am just trying to stop the worst form of dystopia,
which in my mind is government, and I think to the First Amendment
framers' minds was government with the power to regulate speech re-
gardless of who the speaker was.
Audience Participant: Mr. Jaffe, you're saying that the govern-
ment shouldn't say who has the right to speak and who does not, which I
generally agree with. However, your approach to this question ignores
the fact that a corporation is largely a creation of the government in the
first place, in the sense that it is an association of persons. But the gov-
ernment, in granting a corporation's charter, recognizes and gives it lim-
ited liability for the shareholders and also creates a mechanism for the
easy transfer of the corporation's ownership through shares, which are a
means through which corporations accumulate great wealth and profit.
This allows them to have a booming voice in terms of their speech.
I question the fundamental premise that the starting place of corpo-
rations exists so the government shouldn't be allowed to say that they
can or cannot speak. The government creates the corporations in the first
place, and it is a function of that creation in which their rights to free
speech can be limited.
Erik Jaffe: I disagree with the implication that there's a right to
privilege distinction, which is the underlying point of your question-the
notion that since we gave you power, we can take it back. As much as we
feel like it, Bill Gates is no less a creature of government policies than
Microsoft. His great and tremendous wealth is a function of dozens and
dozens of government benefits, privileges, and policies that allow him
personally to accumulate that wealth, whether it's the tax structure, lower
rates of capital gains, or corporate law itself which allows Microsoft to
do so well. Yet, the fact that he has a tremendous amount of money is not
a justification to restrict his speech, although that is the argument now
creeping into the campaign finance debate-that it's not merely corpora-
tions, it's rich people. In fact, it is a suspicion of aggregations of wealth
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unduly influencing political debate. I rejected the premise that the notion
of undue influence exists. I don't think influence mediated through
speech can ever be undue, so I would take that out of the equation.
To answer the deeper question, I don't think the government is
obliged to allow corporations to exist in their limited liability format. In
fact, at some level I would be open to the prospect, though I haven't fully
thought it through, of taking away limited liability for our corporations'
expressive activities, so long as you apply full First Amendment scrutiny
to any lawsuits against the expressive activities. So, if a corporation li-
bels somebody, I'm not sure we need to give the corporation limited li-
ability, particularly if you think about a corporation that's small or that's
of limited resources and couldn't pay a big libel judgment.
I might well go to the shareholders for that. It would be an interest-
ing discipline on corporate speech to then remove that restriction while
allowing limited liability for purely economic activities, such as if I made
a contract with a supplier to buy widgets and I didn't pay. So your point
is well taken in the sense that they're not obliged to give those benefits.
But having given them, they can't then just take back speech rights.
That's more my point-you can't discriminate against speech in that
fashion.
Kent Greenfield: A couple of other things that are probably worth
remembering and bracketing is that it seems like our working assumption
is that the theory of the First Amendment is about free market of ideas.
There are a number of other theories of the First Amendment, including
the self-realization theory,20 which is the feel-good theory. Also, there's
the town meeting approach,21 otherwise known as the Alexander Meik-
lejohn approach, that would say that it is about political discourse. Just
like in a town meeting, the richest person in the room doesn't get to talk
more; there's a norm of equality. Under that theory, even in the pursuit
of political vision of the First Amendment, there are grounds for regula-
tion of speakers, even individual, natural persons so that there's a notion
of fair discourse, just as in a classroom taking turns is the norm. In the
public discourse, one might think that would be true as well.
Audience Participant Martin Redish: I think there's a fallacy of the
New England town meeting in that example. In the New England town
meeting that Meiklejohn was talking about, you knew who was there.
You knew who heard what and when. You can't assume that for
20. See generally Thomas Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First
Amendment, 125 U. PENN. L. REV. 744 (1977).
21. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22(1948).
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communication outside that kind of confined setting, so the principle of
cloning doesn't really work as well.
My main question was for Professor Greenwood to follow up on
something that Mr. Jaffe mentioned and to expand on it. It was a very
eloquent attack, a socioeconomic, political, and moral attack on markets,
free-market theory, and resolving issues on the basis of market values.
What I did not hear was some sort of coherent First Amendment frame-
work that you are using as an anchor to get to your "therefore."
I'm wondering to what extent your view is based more on hostility
to the substantive positions that corporations would take than to some
kind of structural process-based First Amendment analysis, and then
would that just reduce your views to a kind of viewpoint discrimination?
Daniel Greenwood: On the contrary: I have nothing against mar-
kets. I'm in favor of markets. Markets are terrific. The problem for me is
structural and process. There are two process problems. The first process
problem is that all economic activity is speech, so there has to be some
limits on the First Amendment, which in each of its various forms is a
restriction of government activity, or else you end up with no govern-
ment regulation of the markets. With no government regulation of mar-
kets, the markets look an awful lot like Beirut in the middle of a civil
war. Those are not attractive markets, so lines have to be drawn. The
complaint about corporations as participants in the political debate,
whether it's a Meiklejohnian debate or a free market of ideas debate,
seems to me to be that it works either way.
The complaint about corporations is that real human beings have
many views on many issues, a capacity for changing their mind, and a
right to self-govern, while corporations have none of these characteris-
tics. Corporations are structurally incapable of changing their mind, or
can change their mind only within limited ways; that is, you can per-
suade a corporation that it has made a mistake about how best to profit
maximize. What you can't do under current corporate law, or any other
form of corporate law that would provide us with the goods that we want,
is persuade the corporation and the market system that it ought not pur-
sue profits. That's what markets do. So, what you have is an instrument
that is devoted to pursuing profit. When that instrument, the corporation,
becomes a political participant, it's simply a political participant on one
side of a controversial issue with no countervailing power.
I guess I plead guilty to the viewpoint discrimination claim to a
limited degree; that is, my argument would be that we've created a sys-
tem in which one particular viewpoint gets to spend vast amounts of
money. It seems to me that unless you accept the fact that money is
irrelevant, which strikes me as a bizarre concept, and unless you think
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that advertising does not actually affect people, and unless you think that
more speech is always good and that spam is the best thing of all, so that
ultimately if the quantity doesn't make any difference and if money
makes no difference, then when you create a system that says all the
money is on this side of the position, and it's money that has no owner,
or it's fundamentally different than Bill Gates' money because it's some-
body else's money, the result is that this somebody isn't there; there is no
somebody. It is actually institutional money.
Erik Jaffe: There are several flaws with that. The first flaw is the
statement that all economic activity is speech. It's not, at least by defini-
tion, because the First Amendment says speech is different. That's why
it's there. If speech were no different than other behavior relegated for
rational behavior scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment, we would not
really have a First Amendment. So, constitutionally there is a difference
between speech and economic activity, and you have to draw that line.
You could probably treat corporate speech differently in terms of giving
more control to shareholders and things like that. Then you would
necessarily treat corporate economic behavior like buying widgets.
Second, I don't think speech is ineffective. I think it's effective ac-
cording to the value of the idea conveyed. Everyone is always hopeful
that speech will be effective, and they always speak a lot because of that
way. They want wide dissemination to expand their audience so that they
get a larger percentage of people who agree with them. They get that
percentage as effectively as possible, but the notion that speech per se
will necessarily change minds is deeply flawed, and once again, a consti-
tutionally impermissible notion.
No amount of advertising in the world would have made Ishtar 2 a
successful movie. That's just the way it is. The more you advertise, the
less people would have gone to see it as they saw what the movie was
actually about. That's also true of political candidates running for office.
It is also true of corporate propositions. I think it's empirically true due
to the fact that we have a lot of accounting restrictions now, and the fact
that corporate managers are being subjected to greater and greater
criminal liability with new laws that subject them to a lot of restrictions.
Furthermore, the fact that smoking is getting restricted all across
the country suggests that corporations are not the controlling and domi-
nant creatures that we might think, but rather are engaged in a push and
pull in their idea of gain or lose traction as they will, notwithstanding the
fact that they spend a lot of money.
22. ISHTAR (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1987).
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Audience Participant: I apologize, first, that I am not a constitu-
tional lawyer. I'm a trial lawyer, and I have a rather humble question
which reflects on how all of us, or many of us, think as attorneys; that is,
are we perhaps limiting ourselves too much by looking at a construct
such as the First Amendment? By doing that, we're failing to drill down
to what the deeper and more fundamental problem really is, and that is
the problem we're all struggling to get at.
Let me give you just a little bit of personal context on this. As a
trial lawyer, when I deliver a case and argument to a jury of non-lawyers,
it's true that the two parties presenting different sides of an argument
have the same amount of time, and one would assume that a jury would
then be able to weigh the speech that each has given. However, the real-
ity of the situation is that you're not dealing with a blank slate. You're
dealing with an audience, with a population, with a citizenry that comes
to that forum in advance with a history of arguments, propaganda,
speech, volume, and noise that's been presented, which tends to shape
the way that they receive the speech.
I realize that one of our speakers is talking about how we're talking
about the speakers and not the listeners, but what talking is about is
communication, which involves the receiving end as well. You're not
dealing with a blank slate. My reason for bringing this up is that the point
of making arguments in court is to communicate an idea that will be re-
ceived by an independent body that can logically and honestly evaluate
what's being said and then make a decision. The fact that there may be
equal speech may be irrelevant if you don't have an audience which is
primed to be receiving only a certain message and for thinking in only a
certain way, and that way of thinking can be distorted.
My question, essentially, is can it be distorted to the point where all
we're talking about is the First Amendment rights of the speaker? That
question becomes unimportant, however, because over time the way you
have massaged and shaped the audience, the citizenry, the people in the
country, makes them unreceptive to hearing my speech. In other words,
free speech almost becomes irrelevant when it's been completely over-
whelmed by certain entities who have power and have money and time to
carry it out.
Erik Jaffe: I think Professor Greenwood would say yes to that. My
answer is that you're assuming a bounded decision-making process much
like the town hall.
The First Amendment discussions are ongoing conversations. At
the end of the day, I am viscerally opposed-and I think the First
Amendment is by definition opposed-to letting the government decide
how to massage the audience as to whether they will or won't be
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protected in their particular arguments and whether they are being suffi-
ciently open-minded or not. That's just not a decision the government
gets to make.
Daniel Greenwood: This is exactly my point. In fact, the govern-
ment has made that point: that what the corporate system does is massage
the audience.
Erik Jaffe: The government doesn't do it. It allows it; there's a
huge difference.
Audience Participant: The idea that the First Amendment exists to
protect a market place of ideas is an interesting one, but what about the
idea that the First Amendment exists to protect the ability to have a bal-
anced democratic conversation? What about the fact that we're here to-
day to look at the health of our democracy and how the First Amendment
plays into that idea?
I think it's important to look at how all of this speech by the
wealthy elite is drowning out the voice of people like me, who have stu-
dent loans and have to go to work every day and can't write $2,000
checks. What about my ability to participate equally in a democratic
process and have my voice count? What would you say the First
Amendment dialogue around that should be?
Daniel Greenwood: Let me make a small point on that. I didn't
speak about the problem of wealth in the abstract, in part because it
seems to me that it is too complicated to intelligently discuss within ten
minutes. That one is quite complicated. The issue that I was raising is the
issue of wealth controlled by fiduciaries who have a legally mandated
fiduciary obligation to use wealth in a particular way. It seems to me that
regardless of your view about wealth itself, you have to be disturbed by
this fiduciary red light.
Let me just make one point about wealth with actual owners. A
commonplace 18th century political theory, the political theory that the
First Amendment comes from, was that republics could only exist with a
certain minimum level of equality. In that context, equality was normally
understood as meaning nobody should have enough money to be able to
buy another person, at least another citizen-an ironic position given our
own origins. There's an enormous amount of truth to that point, although
it has anything to do with the argument made here. I'm sympathetic to
the notion that at a certain points wealth functions quite differently from
speech. The equation of buying speech to speak is one that puts our
politics up for sale, and is, therefore, improper.
Erik Jaffe: To the extent that we have a problem with economic
disparities such that some people are capable of speaking more loudly
than other people, those disparities should not be solved through restrict-
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ing speech, but instead should be solved by correcting the imbalances,
even to the point of straight up redistribution of wealth. This is a sort of
taking the non-speech path first before restricting speech. That's the
critical distinction between the high standards of the First Amendment
and the low standards on economic regulation. If you really think it's a
problem, it's a problem not just for speech but for a lot of things; we
should give you money. You should speak all you want if that's a
genuine problem.
Kent Greenfield: Thank you for an excellent panel.
